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Introduction
In June 2008, The Economist published an article discussing the pros and cons of a preceding oil price boost. On the one hand, the rise might be considered as "a gigantic carbon tax" that helped ghting global warming. On the other hand, it particularly hurt the poor who spent a considerably higher proportion of their income on fuel than the rich. Financial compensations for the core energy demand could help to solve the issue. However "it seems odd to try to prevent energy use with higher taxes . . . and then to subsidise it" (The Economist, 2008) . The article thereby raised the question how to design green taxes optimally while accounting for distributive concerns. Rising awareness for global environmental problems under persisting inequality has increased the salience of that question. I propose an answer to it. I focus on the optimal level of environmental taxation and how it changes with the level of redistribution. Despite a huge theoretical literature on environmental taxation and quite some empirical interest on its impact on poor households, the normative question of the optimal response to inequality concerns in the environmental tax design has not had that much of attention.
I employ a simple Mirrlees (1971) income taxation framework which I extend by consumption externalities as proposed by Cremer et al. (1998) . Within this framework, a welfareoptimising government uses non-linear income taxes to redistribute and Pigouvian taxation to reduce negative externalities (Pigou, 1932) . I show that the two tax design problems are interconnected. In particular, the higher the level of redistribution, the lower the optimal level of environmental taxation. The optimal level has two determinants. First, the marginal social damage caused by the externality. Second, the cost of public funds, de ned as the immediate marginal welfare losses associated with income tax collection. 1 If the government puts more weight on redistribution, it will have to accept a higher cost of public funds. Marginal revenues from the environmental tax are then more valuable from the government's 1 In formal terms, the cost of public funds is the Lagrangian multiplier of the resource constraint. point of view. Contrary to naive intuition, this calls for a lower environmental tax rate. The reason is that the tax rate is at its e cient level if the marginal revenues exactly compensate society for the marginal external harm. The more valuable the marginal revenues are, the less one needs to compensate for the marginal externality. To put it another way, consider the Pigouvian tax as a bribe that consumers pay the authorities in order to get allowance for pollution. The government is willing to accept a lower bribe if its utility per dollar is higher.
Exactly this is the case if the cost of public funds is higher.
I measure the level of redistribution by a parameter that corresponds to the weight of less productive agents in a social-welfare function. As explained, Pigouvian taxation needs to decrease if the parameter increases. When rst-best instruments are available, however, the result reverses. Without distortions, the cost of public funds actually decreases in the parameter, as the disutility of the hard working high productive agents receives less weight in the welfare function. Hence the rst-best level of Pigouvian taxation increases with the level of redistribution.
My main contribution with respect to the existing literature is to draw attention to the level of Pigouvian taxation. Most of the respective literature focuses on tax rules and concludes that the distortions caused by second-best instruments do not alter these rules compared to rst-best. I show that, despite the rst-best shape of these rules, the second-best level of Pigouvian taxation in fact depends on the distortions and the available income tax instruments.
The paper also contributes to a branch of the literature that uses linear tax schemes to analyse the double-dividend hypothesis. Major insights from the linear model carry over to my setting with incentive constraints and optimal taxes. In particular, the optimal enviromental tax is lower in second-than in rst-best.
Related literature
This paper is part of a literature in which Pigouvian taxation meets non-linear income taxes under asymmetric information (Mirrlees, 1971) . Cremer et al. (1998) show that under the separability assumptions from Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) the optimal Pigouvian tax rate is uniform, i.e., it does not discriminate between agents. Gauthier and Laroque (2009) generalise the insight: a certain part of the second-best problem can be separated such that rst-best rules apply for that part of the problem. Examples include Pigouvian taxation and the Samuelson Rule. Hellwig (2010) presents a similar result. Kopczuk (2003) , Pirttilä and Tuomala (1997) , Jacobs and de Mooij (2011), and Kaplow (2012) explicitly centre on externality taxation within a general (income) taxation problem.
In terms of questions posed their contributions are close to mine. Their answers have a di erent focus, though. Kopczuk (2003) proposes to decompose the general taxation problem with externalities into two parts: "First, calculate the appropriate Pigouvian tax necessary to correct the externality. Then, with the externality accounted for, the usual second-best problem can be solved using standard formulae. " (p. 84) His result holds for a variety of speci cations (including the model presented here) and generalises the 'principle of targeting' (Dixit, 1985) . Kopczuk (2003) also points out, though, that actually the two parts are interrelated: the Pigouvian tax rate might only be known after the whole problem is solved. My comparative statics analysis characterises this interrelation. Kaplow (2012) summarises his ndings by stating "that simple rst-best rules -unmodi ed for labor supply distortion or distribution -are correct in the model examined. " My analysis highlights that distribution and distortions have a signi cant in uence on environmental policy with respect to tax levels, though. Jacobs and de Mooij (2011, p. 2) nd that the "optimal second-best tax on an externalitygenerating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds". However, they use a non-standard de nition for the cost of public funds. Our formal analyses are consistent but focus on di erent interpretations.
An earlier branch of the literature, dating back to Sandmo (1975) , examines environmental taxation as part of linear tax systems. Starting with Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) , the linear-taxation model was a primer workhorse model in the discussion of the doubledividend hypothesis. 2 By a central result of this literature, the second-best environmental tax is below the rst-best one (e.g. Orosel and Schöb, 1996) . As I show, these insights carry over to the case of optimal/non-linear income taxation. Metcalf (2003) uses the linear model to carry out a comparative static analysis with a focus on environmental quality. My analysis also relates to the literature on comparative static properties of non-linear taxation, with and without public goods (Weymark, 1987; Brett and Weymark, 2008; Bierbrauer and Boyer, 2010) , and to applied analyses of the question how to overcome negative distributional e ects of environmental taxes (like Metcalf, 1999; West, 2005; Ekins and Dresner, 2004) . Rausch et al. (2011) recently studied the U.S. economy, Kosonen (2012) did so for the European Union. The empirical papers investigate the relationship between household income and emission-heavy consumption like driving or heating in order to check whether environmental taxes are regressive. They also discuss distributional impacts of environmental taxes and policies to support the poorest household. I add insights from normative theory to the discussion. In particular, I show that (a) emission-heavy consumption should not be subsidised for poor households and (b) whether or not environmental taxes are regressive is not per se relevant for their optimal level. The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 states the rule for optimal internalisation. Section 4 introduces tax systems. Section 5 analyses optimal environmental taxes and provides the main results. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix holds proofs and formal results. It also characterises optimal allocations and discusses corner solutions.
Model

Production
The model is based on Cremer et al. (1998) . It considers three di erent goods. First, an intermediate good that is referred to as output and is denoted by Y . It serves as the numeraire and may be interpreted as money. Second, a clean, completely private consumption good, C, and third, a dirty consumption good, D. The intermediate good can be transformed into the consumption goods at xed rates of transformation equal to p C and p D , respectively. Parameters p C and p D may be interpreted as the producer prices of C and D. The intermediate good itself can be produced with a linear technology using labour as the single input good (but labour is not modelled explicitly). The rate of transformation between labour and the intermediate good mirrors productivity and is denoted by w. It may be interpreted as the wage rate.
Households and allocations
There is a continuum of measure one of agents. They di er in exactly one dimension, namely their productivity, which can be either low or high. An agent's type is denoted by θ ∈ {L, H}. Their respective productivity is w θ ∈ {w L , w H }. The fraction of low-type agents is denoted by γ ∈ (0, 1). An allocation A speci es levels of (C, D, Y ) for both generic types,
. For a given allocation the utility of an agent of type θ is
Function u is continuously di erentiable three times, strictly increasing, strictly concave, has nonnegative cross derivatives, and satis es the Inada conditions. 3 It represents private consumption utility. In order to produce Y θ units of output, an agent has to provide Y θ /w θ units of labour. This provision is associated with a linear disutility. The last term in the utility function re ects the externality. Independently of his type, every agent su ers from the overall consumption of dirty goods, γD L +(1−γ)D H . The social harm is proportional to total dirty good consumption, and e > 0. From an agent's point of view, own consumption has no negative e ect on own utility as a single contribution is negligible in comparison to the large contribution of others. Individual contributions are in fact zero due to the assumption of a continuum of agents. 4
Notice that all agents in society have quite similar preferences. In particular, their consumption choice for a given budget is identical. Also, they su er from the externality in exactly the same way. This is not only a simpli cation but rather a design choice. If agents had di erent tastes for environmental protection, then the optimal policy would obviously depend on distributional considerations. The homogeneity in agents' preference allows to isolate the more subtle relations between equity and environmental policy.
Social welfare
This paper takes a normative perspective by examining what a social planner (SP) would do in order to maximise the social welfare function W , de ned as
where A is the allocation. The welfare function is a weighted sum of the generic types'
utilities. The parameter α measures the weight SP puts on a generic low-type agent. If α = γ, then W is the utilitarian welfare function. For α = 1, W would be the Rawlsian welfare function.
Overall, the economy cannot consume more than it produces in terms of output. Furthermore, an exogenous revenue requirement r has to be met. The social planner thus faces a resource constraint given by
If (1) holds and A ≥ 0, then A is feasible. An allocation that maximises W among all feasible allocations is a rst-best allocation.
If the social planner does not observe an agent's type, not all feasible allocations are implementable. If, for instance, an allocation disadvantages the high-type agents, they might have an incentive to pretend to be low-types, making it impossible to implement this allocation. As a consequence, under asymmetric information, SP has to ensure that agents do not want to misrepresent their type. This is the case if the following incentive-compatibility constraints hold.
The underlying idea about the relation between incentive compatibility and decentral implementation, i.e. taxation, is known as the 'Taxation Principle' (Hammond, 1979; Guesnerie, 1998) . 5 An allocation that maximises welfare among all feasible, incentive-compatible allocations is a second-best allocation.
5 For a complete formal argument see Aigner (2011).
By means of the following assumption, I restrict the analysis to the cases in which SP likes to redistribute from high-type agents to low-type agents.
The assumption generally holds if SP puts a su ciently high welfare weight on low-type agents. The lower w L is relative to w H , the lower α may be, because a large di erence in productivity provides an e ciency argument for making high-types work more than lowtypes. A low population share γ of low-types makes redistribution in their favour very cheap, hence it also allows for a low α.
Given the shape of u, it is e cient to produce strictly positive amounts of the consumption goods rather than abstain from economic activity. In turn, agents have to provide output. A look at Assumption 1 and the de nition of W shows that, in terms of welfare, it is always better to let the high-rather than the low-type agents produce an output unit. Consequently, high-type agents should produce all output. In rst-best, this is indeed the case. 6 In secondbest, this might be out of reach, as incentive constraints have to be satis ed. It is then ambiguous whether low-type agents work. My main analysis focuses on the cases in which they do work, i.e. Y L > 0. In these cases a reallocation of output provision from low-to hightype agents improves welfare, but is possible only if high-types' incentive constraint (3) is slack. Consequently, at an interior second best allocation, (3) needs to bind. As Assumption 1 favours the low-type agents, their incentive constraint (2) is always slack. 7
In Appendix C, I discuss existence and comparative statics properties of second-best allocations with Y L = 0.
Optimal Internalisation
This section provides a general property of Pareto-optimal allocations, with respect to the externality. At rst sight, the presented rule is identical for rst-and second-best allocations. This is a reason why redistribution and distortions are sometimes considered to have no structural in uence on Pigouvian taxation. In the next step, I show, however, in what way the rst-and second-best rules are in fact di erent.
To shorten exposition, I use the following notation for J, K ∈ {C, D}. u L := u(C L , D L ),
. Analogous de nitions apply to
The Lagrangian multiplier of the resource constraint is denoted by λ.
All results in the current section are derived in Appendix A.
A rule for optimal internalisation
Both rst-and second-best allocation feature the property that the marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between the two consumption goods are the same for both types of agents.
Rather than being equal to the rate of transformation (namely, producer-price ratio), as would be the case in an unregulated market, the MRS is equal to
This is a standard result in the literature. It follows, for instance, from the more general analysis by Hellwig (2010). It is driven by the separability feature of the utility functions. The intuition carries over partially to the case where an externality is introduced. In fact, as agents are equal in terms of their consumption preferences and their exposure to the externality, there is no point in treating them di erently in this respect. Yet, it is no longer true that optimal redistribution only a ects the labour market. Optimal consumption now depends on multiplier λ. The multiplier is crucially related to redistribution. Also, while at rst sight the above formula is the same for both rst-and second-best allocation, λ is di erent in rst-and second-best. This has signi cant consequences for the relation between the degree of redistribution and the degree of intervention in the commodity market.
The cost of public funds
There is no universal de nition for the (marginal) cost of public funds in the literature.
Jacobs (2012), for instance, recently suggested a de nition which implies a marginal cost of 1 for typical optimal taxation schedules. In this paper I stick to the classical de nition, used for example in the textbook by Dahlby (2008); the (marginal) cost of public funds measure the loss in welfare associated with raising tax revenues. Being a cost, the concept does not account for potential bene ts from the revenues. It just tells how (welfare-)costly it is to raise a (marginal) tax dollar.
As is well known, the so de ned (marginal) cost of public funds are equal to λ, the Lagrangian multiplier for the resource constraint (1). Formally, λ = −∂Ŵ /∂r, whereŴ is the optimised value of the welfare function. Throughout the paper I normally drop the explicit "marginal" when referring to the cost of public funds -relying on the fact that concept is per se a marginal one. Also, "multiplier" interchangeably refers to λ, i.e., the cost of public funds.
The quasi-linearity in labour allows for closed-form solutions for the multiplier and plainly reveals the dissimilarity between rst-and second-best. It also shows the dependency on the underlying parameters α and γ.
Second-best The value of the multiplier at an interior second-best allocation is
To grasp the intuition, note that agents do not bene t from r, so an increase is pure burden. A way to nance the additional requirement is to increase output. As the incentive constraint for the high-type agents is binding, their output may only be increased if the low-type's output is increased as well. The weighted welfare loss of such an increase is equal to α/w L for the generic low-type and (1 − α)/w H for the generic high-type. Notice that the multiplier does not depend on the population shares. The reason is that a higher revenue requirement has to be produced by all agents (independently of their type) in order to sustain incentive compatibility.
First-best The multiplier at the rst-best allocation is
Because only high-types work in rst-best, only parameters related to them matter for λ F . If SP needs an additional unit of revenue, he will make high-type agents work more. As there are only 1 − γ high-type agents, the generic high type has to provide 1/(1 − γ) (marginal) units of output and needs to work 1/(w H (1 − γ)) additional hours. The incurred marginal disutility is weighted by 1 − α.
The multipliers are not only di erent in size, but also with respect to their directions of change in the parameters α and γ. The welfare weight has an impact on the optimal tax design with respect to the externality. If interpreted naively, the optimal rule (4) itself hides this fact.
Taxation
The current section adapts the interpretation of output being money. In this interpretation, Y denotes gross income, w corresponds to the wage rate, and p C , p D are producer prices.
Now it is meaningful to introduce taxes and to nd tax systems that implement particular allocations.
A tax system τ = (t C , t D , T ) consists of an income tax function T and speci c commodity
Consumption may be subsidised through negative commodity taxes. T may be negative as well, in which case it is a transfer to the agent.
For any type θ,
) be the maximisers of individual utility, given τ :
As before, households take D L and D H as given, so the externality is not relevant for their decision.
When choosing a tax system, the social planner takes individual optimisation into account and needs to respect the following scal budget constraint, which is equivalent to resource constraint (1).
Here, T L (τ ) and T H (τ ) amount to the respective total income tax payments of low-and high-type agents.
If (8) is satis ed for some tax system τ , then τ is said to implement allocation A with
as de ned by (7). The set of available tax systems to choose from depends on the informational constraints. When the social planner can observe an agent's type, the income tax may be contingent on the type. Under asymmetric information it can only be contingent on observed gross income. In fact, with
, it is possible to nd a system τ that implements the rst-best
, it is possible to nd a system τ that the second-best allocation. This insight allows to restrict attention to the chosen tax structure albeit the linearity in commodity taxation. 9
Normalisation
As usual in these type of models, there is a degree of freedom in the taxation choice. A common way to deal with this is to normalise the tax system and often it is innocuous to do so. Yet, when properties of the tax system, like a particular tax level, are the object of interest rather than the real allocation, one has to be careful with normalisations.
This was a major issue in the double-dividend discussion between Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994); Bovenberg and Mooij (1997), Fullerton (1997) and others. The discussion centres on the comparison of the second-best pollution tax and the rst-best Pigouvian tax (the marginal social harm). The actual tax level obviously depends on the chosen normalisation and a priori it is unclear which normalisation is "correct". In a related contribution, Schöb (1997) focuses on the normalisation choice and shows that also "the di erence of the rst-best and second-best optimal tax on the polluting good depends on the normalization chosen. " (p. 174) He concludes that "such a comparison provides an inappropriate indicator for the existence of a second dividend. " (ibid.)
To obtain valid results on comparative static properties of environmental taxation and the relation between rst-and second-best level, it is important to avoid the "normalization trap" (Schöb, 1997) . Orosel and Schöb (1996) propose to study an object called the secondbest internalization tax. Unlike an actual tax rate, it is a "real" variable, derived directly from the underlying allocation, and independent of the normalisation. 10 Using their concept, the authors nd a particular normalisation to be correct for doing the comparison of actual rstvs. second-best tax rates. which is independent of the normalisation and measures tax-induced incentives to reduce pollution. It is conceptually similar to the second-best internalisation tax of Orosel and Schöb (1996) . Also, it turns out that the greenness equals the tax rate t D on the dirty good i the tax rate t C on the clean good is normalised to zero: precisely the normalisation identi ed as "correct" by Orosel and Schöb (1996) for the respective purpose.
For this reason it is save to proceed the analysis with t C ≡ 0. For further reference, I call such a tax system normalised.
The optimal Pigouvian tax
Given 
5.1. The comparative statics of Pigouvian taxation
The following Propositions essentially combine equation (9) with the ndings from Section 3.2. They state the main result of the paper: comparative static properties of those tax systems that implement the rst-and second-best allocation, respectively.
Proposition 1 (First-best Pigouvian taxation). If a normalised tax system τ F = (0, t F D , T F ) implements the rst-best allocation A F , then
Despite the lack of distortions, distributive concerns in uence the environmental tax; more redistribution calls for a higher rst-best Pigouvian tax t F D . The relation reverses completely if rst-best instruments are not available and the labour market is distorted.
Proposition 2 (Second-best Pigouvian taxation). If a normalised tax system τ * = (0, t * D , T * )
implements an interior second-best allocation A * , then
Furthermore,
In a nutshell, higher labour market distortions coming from increased redistribution imply a lower optimal Pigouvian tax level. To develop a detailed intuition for the results, decompose the comparative statics into two aspects. (1) In rst-as well as in second-best t D is inversely proportional to λ.
(2) The reaction of λ di ers for rst-and second-best. The rst aspect is not new. It is already well established for models of linear labour/commodity taxation. As shown, it carries over to a world with incentive constraints. The second aspect has not drawn that much of attention in the literature but is crucial as it drives the reversed results. I discuss the two aspects in turn.
The inverse relationship of t D and λ
To grasp the intuition behind the inverse relation, consider the purpose of Pigouvian taxation: its (only) goal is to restore the e cient level of dirty-good consumption. From a welfare perspective, a unit of the dirty-good should be consumed if and only if consumption is not only individually optimal, but private bene ts also outweigh social harm. Consequently, dirty-good consumption is at its socially optimal level only if marginal private (net) bene ts exactly equal marginal social harm. To measure and compare these two objects, it is useful to quantify them in terms of money.
(1) The optimising agent is willing to pay t D units of additional taxes for the right to consume her last unit of D rather than spending the respective money on C. So t D is a good measure of (net) private bene ts of the marginal unit of dirty-good consumption.
(2) Now consider the social planner. If D increases by one unit, welfare decreases by e.
If SP receives exactly e/λ units of money to relax the budget constraint, welfare increases by (e/λ)λ = e. Thus the marginal social harm measured in money is equal to e/λ. It is the exact amount of money that society needs as a compensation for additional dirty-good consumption. The amount is lower if the received money is more useful in the sense that the cost of public funds is higher. Putting together (1) and (2) shows that if t D = e/λ, then individual maximisation leads to an allocation in which, at the margin, private (net) bene ts equal social harm.
A more naive view, which evaluates Pigouvian taxes in a partial or isolated manner rather than viewing it as part of a whole tax system, could reason that 'Pigouvian taxes do two things: reduce pollution and create revenue. So they should be high if pollution is severe or if revenues are very valuable to the state. ' Naive intuition would thus suggest that higher cost of public funds (associated with marginal tax revenue being more valuable) should lead to higher Pigouvian tax rates. In fact, this 'rationale' would provide a straightforward argument for the double dividend hypothesis, which by now has been mostly falsi ed (e.g., Fullerton and Metcalf, 1998) . The strong form of the double-dividend hypothesis states that a revenue-neutral introduction of green taxes is desirable even if environmental bene ts are not taken into account (Goulder, 1995) . In the model that I propose this fails clearly:
Pigouvian taxation, namely t D > 0, is optimal only if an externality is present, i.e., if e > 0.
Among others, Bovenberg (1999) gives the same argument, albeit for a model with linear taxation. Empirical investigations by Goulder (1995) tend to reject the hypothesis as well.
The intuition that rejects the double dividend hypothesis is also central to the comparative static analysis. The more valuable the marginal tax revenues, the less is needed to compensate for the marginal externality, and -because the one and only purpose of Pigouvian taxation is to induce alignment of private bene ts and social harm at the margin -a lower Pigouvian tax rate is asked for. Various authors have noticed the underlying rationale in their respective settings, so it applies quite universally (e.g., Schöb, 1997) . As Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) put it, "each unit of pollution does not have to yield as much public revenue to o set the environmental damage if this revenue becomes more valuable" (p. 361).
In a recent contribution, Jacobs and de Mooij (2011) make the seemingly contradictory statement that the optimal second-best environmental tax is not sensitive to the cost of public funds at all. Their conclusion follows from a their newly proposed de nition of the cost of public funds. So the di erence in conclusion is one of interpretations rather than formal results. Their interpretation suggests that tax distortions do not play a role for optimal environmental taxes, which clearly is at odds with my analysis. Indeed, Jacobs and de Mooij (2011, p. 13) qualify their interpretation themselves: "The optimal second-best environmental tax does require a correction for distributional concerns and interactions with labor supply, but not for pre-existing tax distortions. " The comparative statics results ll the gap of specifying the "correction for distributional concerns" but also broaden the existing insights by highlighting that even without distortions, distribution concerns in uence the optimal environmental tax level.
I should highlight that the preceding discussion is about marginal rather than total revenues. The di erence is crucial: total revenues from Pigouvian taxation do not compensate for the overall external harm. Although the two gures coincide in the linear speci cation, they generally di er. More to the point, Pigouvian revenues should not be used to compensate the harmed people; it is not its purpose, and it might reduce incentives to avoid exposure to an externality in the rst place (Oates, 1995).
How λ changes in parameters
The changes of t F D and t * D with respect to welfare weight α have di erent signs. This point is worth stressing again as previous contributions with non-linear income taxes tend to high-light the similarities rather than the di erences of rst-and second-best Pigouvian taxes.
This focus comes naturally when examining the optimal rules, which are -almost -identical for rst-and second-best.
For the version of their model that resembles the one of this paper, Cremer et al. (1998) conclude that "the optimal tax on the externality generating good is strictly Pigouvian" (p.
345; Proposition 1), where the term 'Pigouvian' is based on the rst-best tax on the dirty good (De nition 1). Likewise Gauthier and Laroque (2009) show that rst-best rules quite often hold also at second-best allocations if utility is separable. With respect to externalities they nd that "a non-satiated second best allocation can be supported with a rst best Pigovian tax" (Remark 4). 12 Kopczuk (2003) and Kaplow (2012) make similar observations. While all of these ndings are correct, they suggest (quite explicitly in some cases) that distortions are not that relevant for the second best tax. Proposition 2 highlights the opposite. Also, these results might distract from the considerable di erences between rst-and second-best when it comes to tax levels rather than tax rules. In fact, the optimal rule for the model at hand is given in (4) -for both rst-and second-best. Only an inspection of the respective multipliers reveals the di erences between them.
First-best multiplier Recall that only high types work at a rst-best allocation and that λ F is derived from an output increase of high-types. Now, if α increases, SP cares less about hightype agents working more, thus the cost of public fund decrease. Tax revenues generated by t D are less valuable per unit so more (marginal) revenues need to be collected at the optimum. If γ is increased, the generic high-type has to work more for an higher overall output requirement and the cost of public funds increases. Marginal revenues generated by t D now have higher value per unit and less is needed to satisfy optimality condition (9).
Second-best multiplier From (5) the cost of public funds at a second-best allocation is λ * = α/w L + (1 − α)/w H . As λ * does not depend on γ, neither does t * D . The higher the welfare weight of low-type agents, the more redistribution is asked for and the more distortions are accepted. Higher distortions imply higher excess burden of taxation and thereby higher cost of public funds. Marginal revenues from Pigouvian taxation are then more valuable and less marginal revenue is needed to satisfy optimality condition (9). A note on corner solutions So far, the second-best comparative statics assumed an interior solution. Corollary 2 in Appendix C shows that for corner solution the tax on the dirty good does not change at all in α. If for some α the second-best allocation features Y L = 0, then a further increase in α cannot change the optimal allocation: it is neither possible to decrease Y L nor to increase low-type agents' consumption without violating incentive constraints.
First-vs. second-best
Consequently, the optimal tax remains xed. 13
First-vs second-best Pigouvion tax level
Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994) Proposition 3. Fix parameters and consider two normalised tax systems, τ F and τ * , which implement the rst-and second-best allocations, respectively. Then
Proof. (6) and (5) imply λ * − λ F > 0 due to Assumption 1. t * D < t F D follows from (9) .
Following the discussion of the comparative statics, the intuition for the result should be clear. The second-best tax system distorts the labour market which increases the cost of public funds compared to a rst-best system. The di erence in the cost of public funds causes the di erence in the tax levels. 13 The result is shown to hold for α ≥ γ. I expect it to hold for a broader range of parameters, though. 14 See also Schöb (2005) . As detailed in Section 4.1 and the references mentioned there, the comparison hinges on the "correct" normalisation choice, which by now is well-understood (Orosel and Schöb, 1996) . Appendix B.2 justi es the normalisation choice speci cally for the presented model.
The role of regressivity
Environmental taxes are regressive if tax payments in proportion to total consumption spending decrease in total consumption spending. Energy-intensive goods like electricity and heating are often considered to feature regressive consumption pattern, so taxes on these goods might indeed be regressive. The Economist (2008), for instance, is concerned about this possibility in the article I cited in the Introduction. The presumption also gave rise to applied studies on the impact of green tax reforms on low-income households like Metcalf (1999) , West (2005) or Ekins and Dresner (2004) . In an empirical study focusing on the European Union, Kosonen (2012) nds that electricity and heating indeed tend to be regressive but for transport fuel and vehicles it is the other way around; they seem to be progressive. Also, there are considerable di erences between countries. Overall, the actual evidence for regressive spending patterns is quite mixed.
The analysis in this paper contributes to these considerations by showing that the question of regressivity might not be that important after all. By choosing consumption utility u, one could easily induce regressive as well as progressive consumption patterns for the dirty good. Yet, none of this would have an in uence on the optimal level of the environmental tax. The income tax/transfer system might adapt but not so the optimal incentive to reduce pollution.
To be concrete consider a normalised second-best tax system. Now change the underlying sub-utility u in a way to make dirty good spending patterns more/less regressive. How does the optimal tax system change? First, t D does not change. The income tax T generally does change, though. If marginal income taxes changed, the incentive to pollute would change despite constant t D . An analysis of the optimal allocation shows, however, that this is not the case; the distortions necessary for redistribution do not hinge on the particularities of u (see Appendix A, Proposition 5). So, the optimal response to a "sudden regressivity" requires no action with respect to environmental taxes. It could trigger a higher transfer amount to support the poor, though.
Admittedly, this neutrality observation would be diluted without the linearity and separability assumptions. However, regressivity apparently is not relevant for the Pigouvian tax per se -otherwise this should appear in the model presented here, which allows for a pure regressivity e ect.
Conclusion
This paper looks at the interdependence of distributive and environmental policies from a normative perspective. It reveals a qualitative di erence between rst-and second-best.
Distributive goals and environmental policies are linked by the cost of public funds. On the one hand they in uence the optimal environmental tax level, on the other hand they are a function of distribution policies. I nd that if society wants more redistribution, the second-best environmental tax is lower, whereas the rst-best environmental tax is higher.
The results from this paper also clarify some aspects of the literature on Pigouvian taxation. First, it is important to distinguish optimal rules from optimal levels. Many contributions on second-best environmental taxation with non-linear income taxes focus on the optimal tax rule and point out their " rst best avor" 15 , emphasising the similarity of rstand second-best with respect to environmental taxes. My focus on tax level shows signi cant di erences in the level and the parameter dependence. Income tax distortions do play a substantial role for environmental taxes.
Second, insights gained from models with linear income/commodity taxation carry over to settings with non-linear income taxation and incentive constraints. This holds true for the role of distortions as well as the result that the second-best environmental tax falls short of the rst-best one.
15 Gauthier and Laroque (2009, p. 1168) What can be learned in terms of policy implications? First, the view that the two goals of redistribution and environmental protection can be addressed independently by means of two di erent instruments (income tax and Pigouvian taxation) needs to be reconsidered.
In particular, the designer of environmental taxes has to account for the value in terms of welfare that is created by the tax revenues. This value is a function of the income tax Proof. Suppose Y F L > 0. If the total output of all low-type agents is lowered by ∆ ∈ (0, γY F L ), every low-type individual may reduce his own output by ∆/γ. The immediate welfare gain is α∆/(γw L ). To nance the output reduction high types have to increase their total output by ∆, resp. their individual output by ∆/ (1 − γ) . The immediate wel-
The net e ect of the alteration is strictly positive given Assumption 1, a contradiction.
Hence Y F L = 0. Y F H > 0 needs to holds given the Inada-conditions on u.
Lemma 2. If A is a second-best allocation, then 1. At most one incentive compatibility constraint is binding. To complete the argument, it su ces to show that such a bunching allocation is dominated by a constrained laissez-faire allocation. Fix any feasible bunching allocation Lemma 3. If A * is an interior second-best allocation under Assumption 1, then high types'
Y
incentive constraint (3) is binding, low types' incentive constraint (2) is slack.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that (3) was slack, i.e.,
The -perturbed allocation is constructed in a way to keep total output constant. Incentive compatibility is sustained, too. The welfare e ect of the perturbation is
dW is strictly positive precisely under Assumption 1, hence a contradiction.
If IC H is binding then IC L must be slack by Lemma 2.
First-order conditions
Considering the lemmas, an appropriate Lagrangian for an optimal allocation is
Next, set the partial derivatives to zero.
It follows that
For a rst-best allocation, set µ = 0, for an interior second-best allocation, set δ = 0.
Proposition 4 (First-best allocation). Given Assumption 1, allocation A F is a rst-best allocation if and only if it satis es the following system of equations.
Proof. With µ = 0, the Lagrange function (10) is concave and the rst order conditions are necessary and su cient for a solution. Consider conditions (13) and (16) with µ = 0. Then
Notice that the inequality is satis ed if and only if Assumption 1 holds. The statement of the Proposition now follows from conditions (11), (12), (14), (15), and the binding resource constraint (1).
Low-type agents do not work at all. Due to linear disutility from working, Assumption 1 implies that any given amount of output requirement fosters lower aggregated disutility if it is provided solely by high types rather than low types. If Y L could be negative, welfare would be unbounded.
For a moment, ignore the Lagrangian multiplier of the resource constraint λ F . Then consumption of high types is independent of the welfare weight and the population shares, and is just determined by e ciency considerations. It departs from standard results only through a corrective element that takes care of the external e ects of dirty-good consumption. The consumption levels of the low-type agents, though, heavily depend on welfare weights as well as the population shares. The underlying trade-o lies between consumption utility of low-types and disutility of high types, who have to work for the provision of low-type consumption. Low-type productivity w L is irrelevant for the allocation given that they do not work. As u is strictly concave, the whole range of u -except u(s) -lies below that plane. Now consider a point s that also solves the above system but is di erent from s. The tangential plane at s is parallel to the one at s, yet one of the planes is higher than the other. But than it is no longer possible that the whole range of u lies below the lower plane. This creates a contradiction.
Proposition 5 (Interior second-best allocation). If A * is an interior second-best allocation under Assumption 1, then it is unique and solves the following system of equations with d =
Proof. If A * is an interior second-best allocation, then it satis es conditions (13) and (16) with δ set to zero. Then λ * and µ * are uniquely determined and strictly positive. For given values of λ * and µ * , (11), (14), (12), and (15) uniquely determine the consumption levels (uniqueness is established by Lemma 4). Output requirements follow from the binding resource constraint (1) combined with the binding incentive constraint (3).
The conditions for high-type consumption levels are almost identical to the corresponding rst-best conditions (18). The subtle but important di erence lies in the Lagrangian multi-plier λ, which is di erent in rst-and second-best and, most importantly, features di erent comparative statics properties.
The consumption levels of low types are distorted downwards, i.e., the labour choice is distorted in favour of leisure. The distortion is captured by d and is higher if µ * is higher or the di erence in productivities is larger.
B. Taxation
B.1. Proofs of the main results
Proof of Proposition 1. Combining t C ≡ 0 with Proposition 4 and the fact that 1 − γ) ). The comparative statics immediatly follow.
Proof of Proposition 2. Combining t C ≡ 0 with Proposition 5 and the fact that
The comparative statics immediatly follow.
B.2. Discussion of the chosen normalisation
This section justi es the normalisation choice made in the main part of the paper. To do so, I de ne the greenness g which mirrors the tax system's inherent incentives to reduce pollution.
De nition 1. The greenness of tax system τ = (t C , t D , T ) is denoted by g and is de ned as
To see why the greenness is useful, consider an agent who faces some tax system τ and decides to purchase an additional unit of D, while reducing her consumption of C in order to keep total spending constant. The reallocation has consequences for the social planner's tax revenue. By de nition, the greenness gives this hypothetical change in revenues.
From the agent's point of view, g not only includes what they have to pay in taxes for additional consumption of D, but also what they save in taxes when consuming less C. The
Pigouvian rationale is to provide agents with the incentive to shift consumption from D to C. The greenness is an accurate measure of how intense this incentive is. Importantly, it does so independently of the normalisation:
Lemma 5.
1. If tax system τ F implements the rst-best allocation A F , then its greenness g F equals e/λ F , with λ F as given in Proposition 4.
2. If tax system τ * implements an interior second-best allocation A * , then its greenness g * equals e/λ * with λ * as given in Proposition 5.
Proof. For a proof see Aigner (2011).
To sum up, the allocation to be implemented uniquely xes the greenness of a tax system; it corresponds to the external harm relative to the cost of public funds. It is a unambiguous measure of how "green" the tax system is. As such it provides a meaningful base for the comparative static analysis. Now, if τ is a normalised tax system (i.e., t C ≡ 0) then g = t D .
Hence analysing g is equivalent to analysing t D in a normalised tax system.
C. Second-Best Corner Solutions
A second-best corner solution is a second-best allocation with Y L = 0. In this section I show that for some parameters this is the relevant case. I then claim that a corner solution does not change at all if α is increased (Proposition 6). Thereby I extend the comparative statics properties of Pigouvian taxation to instances of corner solutions (Corollary 2). Proposition 6 builds on a conjecture that generalises Lemma 3. Unfortunately, I can only partially verify that conjecture (Lemma 8).
Lemma 6. If A is a second-best allocation and
then A is a corner solution, i.e. Y L = 0.
Proof. By contradiction, assume A is an interior solution. Then it satis es conditions (11) To proceed, let me introduce some convenient notation.
De nition 2. De ne A(α) to be a second-best allocation, in which the welfare weight is
given by α and all other parameters are xed. For α < α and θ ∈ {L, H} de ne U θ := U θ (A(α )), U θ := U θ (A(α )), and dU θ := U θ − U θ .
Quite intuitively, if the taste for redistribution increases, low-type agents receive higher utility. At the same time, high-type agents have to receive lower utility because someone has to pay for the increase in U L . The following lemma formalises this intuition. Notice that also a zero-change in utility is possible.
Lemma 7. If α increases from α to α , then
Proof. From De nition 2 it follows, in particular,
Summing up (21) and (22) yields dU L ≥ dU H . Next, suppose by contradiction that dU H > 0, then dU L > 0, but that contradicts (21). It follows similarly that dU L ≥ 0.
Lemma 3 shows that the incentive constraint of high-type agents binds at interior secondbest allocations, given Assumption 1. Its proof does not work for corner solutions, though.
By contrast, the following lemma does hold for corner solutions, albeit under more restrictive conditions on parameters.
Lemma 8. Suppose α ≥ γ. If A is a second-best allocation, then the incentive constraint (3) for the high-type agents is binding at A.
Proof. I rst show that marginal utility is lower for high-than for low-type agents. Then I show that a marginal redistribution of C from high-to low-type agents increases welfare and hence needs to be ruled out by a binding incentive constraint. Otherwise the allocation cannot be second-best. In term of notation, recall that u θ = u(C θ , D θ ). dD L → 0, the change in welfare is approximately
If α ≥ γ, and u L C > u H C as claimed, then α(1 − γ)u L C − (1 − α)γu H C > 0 and welfare increases.
Hence, a contradiction.
If the welfare function is utilitarian (α = γ) or exhibits an even stronger tendency to redistribute in favour of the low-type agents, high-type agents incentive constraint must be binding. This is not a necessary condition, though. Equation (23) shows that even with α < γ a slack incentive constraint would be impossible, provided that u L C is su ciently greater than u H C . In fact, I believe that the constraint is binding whenever Assumption 1 is satis ed.
Conjecture 1. If A is a second-best allocation under Assumption 1, then high types' incentive constraint is binding at A.
The following proposition is the main result of the current section. If conjecture 1 holds, the proposition and its two corollaries extend to all parameters satisfying Assumption 1. Claim 2: U L (A(α )) = U H (A(α )).
From Lemma 7, U L (A(α )) − U L (A(α )) ≥ U H (A(α )) − U H (A(α )). Given Claim 1 this reduces to U L (A(α )) ≥ U H (A(α ) ). The incentive constraint of high types implies, though, that U H (A(α )) ≥ U L (A(α ) ). Hence U L (A(α )) = U H (A(α )).
Claim 3: A(α ) = A(α ).
Suppose the opposite, then U L (A(α )) > U L (A(α )) by Lemma 7 and the fact that solutions are unique (if they exist). But then Claims 1 and 2 imply that also U H (A(α )) > U H (A(α ) ).
This contradicts Lemma 7.
Increasing the welfare weight of low-type agents does not change the allocation if lowtype agents already provide zero output. The only way to increase their utility is to increase their consumption. But then high-types incentive constraint can no longer be satis ed.
Thus the limits of redistribution (under information constraint) are met, once all output is produced by high-type agents:
Corollary 1. Suppose α ≥ γ. Let A(α ) be a second-best corner solution. Then the Rawlsian allocation A R = lim α→1 A(α) is equal to A(α ). Also, the second-best Pareto-frontier has a kink at
Notice that it is possible that the Rawlsian allocation is not a corner solution. Put di erently, (second-best) redistribution can hit its very limit well before low-type agents provide zero output.
Yet, if for some α < 1, low-type agents' output does equal zero, then, consequently, the comparative statics of Pigouvian taxation are also zero:
Corollary 2. Suppose α ≥ γ. Let A(α) be a second best allocation with Y L = 0. Let t D (α) be the dirty good tax of a normalised tax system that implements A(α). Then t D (α ) = t D (α) for all α ≥ α. 
